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‘ wish to inform the House that an application concerning breaches in the Six 
counties by the British Government of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is being lodged with the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe this afternoon’, declared the late Paddy Hillery, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Dáil (lower house of Parliament) on 16 December 
1971.1 So began the Ireland v. United Kingdom case.2 In light of recent releases of the 
Irish and British State papers , it is timely to examine the behind-the-scenes deliberations 
by both sides during the lengthy proceedings, which culminated in a celebrated judgment 
of the European Court of Human Rights in January 1978 that is still cited as authority for 
the interpretation of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.3 
This paper, which has been prepared as part of a larger research project, examines 
the deliberations of the Irish Government from the time internment in Northern Ireland 
was introduced, on 9 August 1971, to the submission of the application by the Irish 
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government on 16 December of that year. It considers how the decision to submit an 
application to the European Commission of Human Rights became an increasing 
inevitability; and appears to have been recognised as such by British Prime Minister 
Edward Heath. With the decision of the British Government to establish the Compton 
Committee, in September 1971, the arena turned to bilateral consultations between 
Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Jack Lynch and British Prime Minister Edward Heath. When 
these broke down, the Irish Government let Heath know it was ‘seriously considering’ 
submitting an inter-State application. A final decision was taken by the Irish Cabinet on 
30 November 1971 and the filed two weeks later. 
 
Inter-State Petitions under the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Both Ireland and the United Kingdom were founding members of the Council of 
Europe, in 1949, and both countries were deeply engaged in the drafting of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.4 Ireland’s foreign minister at the time, Seán MacBride, 
hoped to use the institution as a forum to advance the central theme in Irish foreign 
policy, the campaign against partition of the island, although he soon learned that there 
was little patience for the debate within a post-war Europe anxious to discourage 
manifestations of nationalism and to promote greater political and cultural cohesion.5 The 
two States ratified the Convention shortly after its adoption in November 1950. 
In addition to setting out a catalogue of human rights norms, which was largely 
inspired by provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,6 the Convention 
also set out implementation mechanisms and provided for the creation of institutions 
where these could be invoked. Two bodies were to be established, the European 
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court on Human Rights.7 In a very 
general sense, the two had a hierarchical relationship, with applications going first to the 
                                                 
4
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5
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Commission and subsequently to the Court. The Commission was eventually abolished, 
in 1998, as part of a restructuring of the Convention organs. 
Under the original Convention, the Commission and the Court were each 
authorised to consider individual petitions, although only if contracting States made a 
special declaration accepting jurisdiction in this regard. Ireland had the distinction of 
being the first State to accept the individual petition mechanism both to the Commission 
and the Court. Perhaps as a result, it was on the receiving end of the first case to come 
before the Court, in an application initiated by Seán MacBride himself, by then a private 
citizen.8 
The Convention also allowed for inter-state applications. Under article 24, ‘Any 
High Contracting Party may refer to the Commission, through the Secretary-General of 
the Council of Europe, any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention by another 
High Contracting Party.’9 Jurisdiction of the Commission to hear inter-State applications 
was an automatic consequence of ratification of the Convention, and in contrast with the 
situation of individual petitions, no supplementary declaration was required. Once the 
Commission had issued its report, the inter-State case could then be referred to the 
European Court of Human Rights by the Commission itself, or by one of the parties10 
where both States had recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.11 This was the 
situation for both Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
The first inter-State applications were filed by Greece against the United 
Kingdom. They concerned repressive measures adopted by the British to suppress the 
independence struggle in Cyprus.12 They were dropped as negotiations for Cypriot 
independence advanced. Austria filed an application against Italy concerning treatment of 
                                                 
8
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9
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and the Genesis of the European Convention, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 924 ff. 
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the German-speaking minority in the Alto Adige.13 Applications were also filed against 
Greece by several European States following the military coup d’état in 1967,14 but they 
were struck from the list following the return of democracy to Greece in 1974.15 Until the 
Irish case, however, no application was considered by the Commission and then adjudged 
by the European Court of Human Rights. Indeed, until the Cyprus v. Turkey case, in 
2001,16 the Irish case remained the only inter-State proceeding before the European Court 
of Human Rights since its establishment in 1959. 
 
Irish Policy Before Internment Was Introduced 
 
The Northern Ireland policy of the Fianna Fáil Government of Jack Lynch 
underwent significant alternation between 1968 and 1971. The traditional call for the end 
to partition and the reunification of the ‘national territory’, as espoused in articles 2 and 3 
of the 1937 Constitution,17 was combined with co-operation on certain economic matters 
with Northern Ireland administrations prior to the outbreak of the Northern Ireland 
‘troubles’ in the late 1960s. While more limited co-operation continued, the Irish 
Government modified its anti-partitionist policy somewhat to accommodate its declared 
support for the civil rights movement. In a January 1969 speech, Jack Lynch referred to 
the need for reform to end discrimination directed at the Catholic minority, while 
                                                 
13
  Austria v. Italy (Pfunders case) (App 788/60), (1961) 4 Yearbook 116 (ECommHR). Following 
the hearing of witnesses and an oral hearing, the Commission prepared a report which it submitted 
to the Committee of Ministers in May 1963. It concluded that Italy had not violated the 
Convention, a finding that was upheld by the Committee of Ministers. The Commission had the 
authority to propose referring the case to the Court, but because Italy had not accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, this would ultimately be dependent upon its consent. The 
Commission decided not to propose referring the case to the Court. See: Austria v. Italy (Pfunders 
case) (App 788/60), (1963) 6 Yearbook 740 (ECommHR).   
14
  Denmark, Norway Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece (First Greek case) (App. 3321/67, 
3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67), (1968) 12 Yearbook 690 (EurCommHr). 
15
  (1977) 6 DR 6. 
16
   Cyprus v. Turkey, No. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV. A preceding inter-State application concluded 
with a friendly settlement. See Denmark v. Turkey, No. 34382/97, ECHR 2000-IV. 
17
  Article 2 of the 1937 Constitution stated that ‘the national territory consists of the while island of 
Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas’. Article 3 declared that ‘pending the re-integration of 
the national territory….the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of 
application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann and the like extra-territorial effect’. Both provisions 
were amended by the constitutional referendum in 1998, which confirmed commitments in the 
Belfast Agreement. Article 3 now explicitly recognises a united Ireland brought by peaceful means 
with the consent of the majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions on 
the island.  
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speaking very limitedly of co-operation. This signalled a distancing from the Stormont 
administration in Belfast, which increased as the ‘Troubles’ intensified. During the period 
of 1969-1970, Minister of External Affairs18 Frank Aiken increasingly adopted a policy 
of pressuring London to take more control over Northern Ireland.19  
Initially, a significant problem in developing a clear policy response to the 
outbreak of the ‘Troubles’ was the lack of information. The Irish Government’s on-the-
ground sources were practically non-existent until Eamonn Gallagher began reporting on 
his discussions with members of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association.20 Many 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs files, relating to the period 1969, are predominantly 
composed of ‘newspaper clippings and transcripts of radio and television broadcasts’. 
There appears to have been an ‘unhealthy dependence on the media for information’.21 
The former Irish Ambassador to the United States, Seán Donlon, has wryly observed that 
at the time the Irish government was better informed on the situation in Nigeria, with 
weekly reports relayed to Dublin from the Irish embassy in Lagos, than it was on the 
situation in Belfast in 1968-70.22 
In 1970, a schism within Fianna Fáil concerning its Northern Ireland policy 
brought the Government close to disintegration. The hard line views of Minister for 
Agriculture Neil Blaney were in complete contrast with the moderate position of Frank 
Aiken. With Aiken’s departure from Cabinet in 1969, Michael Kennedy has argued, the 
aggressive Northern Ireland policy advocated by Blaney had no opponent.23 In response 
to the violence of August 1969 in the aftermath of the Apprentice Boys parade in Derry, 
the Irish Government ordered the Defence Forces to establish relief hospitals along the 
                                                 
18
  The Department of External Affairs was renamed the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1971. 
19
  Michael Kennedy, Division and Consensus: The Politics of Cross-border Relations in Ireland 
1925-1969, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2000, pp. 319-320. 
20
  Ronan Fanning, ‘Playing it Cool: The Response of the British and Irish Governments to the Crisis 
in Northern Ireland 1968-1969’, (2001) 12 Irish Studies in International Affairs 57, at p. 80. 
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‘to have a look’. He subsequently reported his impressions in a note to the Secretary of the 
Department, Hugh McCann, who responded by calling Gallagher to his office to state that ‘nobody 
has ever done this before, why don’t you keep it up?’ Ibid. 
21
  Ibid., at p. 60. 
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  Interview of Seán Donlon by Aisling O’Sullivan, 8 February 2007. 
23
  Michael Kennedy, Division and Consensus: The Politics of Cross-border Relations in Ireland 
1925-1969, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2000, p. 328.  
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border24 and Lynch made a televised address calling for a United Nations peacekeeping 
force. Somewhat later, Aiken’s replacement as foreign minister, Paddy Hillery, 
campaigned to put the situation in Northern Ireland on the agenda of the United Nations 
Security Council.25 After a period of some ambiguity on the subject, Lynch eventually 
affirmed that the Irish government would seek unity by consent through peaceful means. 
He pledged that Dublin would act as the ‘second guarantor’ of the Catholic minority 
community in Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom being the first guarantor.26 
 
Operation Demetrius and the Introduction of Internment 
 
Internment was introduced by a wide arrest operation entitled Operation 
Demetrius, which took place around 4.30 am on Monday 9 August 1971.27 Arrests were 
conducted by the British Army, with the Royal Ulster Constabulary officers ‘very 
occasionally’ acting as guides.28  Some 450 names were on lists prepared by the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary but only 342 people were actually arrested.29 Taylor records that 
3,000 British troops took part in the arrest operation.30  The detainees were taken to either 
Crumlin Road jail in Belfast or the prison ship, the Maidstone, in Belfast harbour.31  
                                                 
24
  Kennedy records Lynch commenting later that the military measures were really a ‘smokescreen’ 
relieving pressure on him within the Cabinet. Ibid., at p. 342. 
25
  See generally Con Cremin, ‘Northern Ireland at the United Nations: August-September 1969’, 
(1980) 1 Irish Studies in International Affairs 2; Noel Dorr, ‘1969: A United Nations 
peacekeeping force for Northern Ireland?’, in Michael Kennedy and Deirdre McMahon, eds., 
Obligations and Responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations, 1955-2005: Essays Marking 
Fifty Years of Ireland’s United Nations Membership, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 
2005. 
26
  Enda Staunton, The Nationalists of Northern Ireland 1918-1973, (Columbia Press, 1973), p274. 
27
  For the British government’s account of internment, see the ‘Compton Report’: Home Office, 
Report of the Enquiry into Allegations Against the Security Forces of Physical bruta lity in 
Northern Ireland arising out of events on 9th August 1971, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1971 Chapter IV, para. 32. See also: Amnesty International, A Report on Allegations of Ill-
treatment Made by Persons Arrested under the Special Powers Act after 8th August 1971; John 
McGuffin, Internment, Dublin: Anvil Books Ltd., 1973. 
28
  ‘Compton Report’, Chapter IV, para. 32. 
29
  Ibid., Chapter II, para. 6. This is generally acknowledged as the number of people arrested. 
However, some accounts differ between 337 and 346. See: John Huston, ed., Brian Faulkner: 
Memoir of a Statesman, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978, p. 123, T. Ryle Dwyer, Nice 
Fellow: A Biography of Jack Lynch, Dublin: Mercier Press, 2001.   
30
  P. Taylor, Brits: The War Against the IRA, London: Bloomsbury, 2001, p. 67. See also: John 
Huston, ed., Brian Faulkner: Memoir of a Statesman, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978, p. 
120.  
31
  ‘Compton Report’, Chapter IV, para. 38. 
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Military intelligence and the RUC Special Branch subjected eleven detainees to 
‘interrogation in depth’.32 This included the application of what became known as the 
‘five techniques’. These combined wall-standing, hooding, sleep deprivation, bread and 
water diet and subjection to continuous white noise33 repeatedly (for a varying number of 
hours at a time) over a number of days.34 
The response to internment was a ‘terrible’ violence.35 By the end of the day on 9 
August, two soldiers and eight civilians had died in rioting in Derry, Strabane, Armagh 
and Newry.36 In Belfast, Protestant and Catholic families alike abandoned their homes; 
some setting fire to them as they left.37 It was estimated that 7,000 Catholics fled across 
the border to five camps set up by Irish Defence Forces on 9 August.38 On the same day, 
the Social Democratic Labour Party, Nationalist and Republican Labour parties called for 
the withholding of rates and rent. This became known as the civil disobedience 
campaign.39 
The decision to introduce preventive detention or detention without trial 
obviously impacted critically on the political situation. In light of Northern Ireland Prime 
Minister Brian Faulkner’s impending announcement of the introduction of internment,40 
Heath had sent a secret telegramme to Lynch.41 Heath referred to a meeting with Faulkner 
the previous week.42 Faulkner had told Heath and his advisers that internment was ‘now 
the right, and indeed inevitable, course’.43 Heath cited the latest Irish Republican Army 
atrocities coupled with the organisation’s declared intention to escalate the violence as an 
indication that internment, ‘however abhorrent’, was essential in order to ensure 
                                                 
32
  Ibid., Chapter VI, para. 44. 
33
  Ibid., para. 47. 
34
  Ibid. 
35
  Jonathan Bardon, A History of Ulster, Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1992), p. 682. 
36
  Ibid. See also Richard Deutsch and Viven Magowan, Northern Ireland (1968-1971): A 
Chronology of Events, Vol. 1 (1968-71), Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1973, p. 119. 
37
  Ibid. 
38
  Ibid. Deutsch and Magowan recorded that some returned to Belfast as the camps were ill-equipped 
to deal with the numbers. 
39
  Richard Deutsch and Viven Magowan, Northern Ireland (1968-1971): a chronology of events, 
Vol. 1 (1968-71) (Blackstaff Press, Belfast, 1973), p119.  
40
  John Huston, ed., Brian Faulkner: Memoir of a Statesman, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1978, p. 121. 
41
  DFA 2003/17/304. 
42
  John Huston, ed., Brian Faulkner: Memoir of a Statesman, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1978, p. 119. 
43
  DFA 2003/17/304  
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economic and social stability in Northern Ireland. The British Government considered the 
internment measure to be a speedier solution to the escalating violence than existing 
security measures, which would only result in a long haul and would be worse for the 
community in the long term.44 The subsequent surge of violence in the aftermath of the 
introduction of internment proved this to be a total miscalculation. 
Heath then turned to tempering Irish reaction. He stated that the British 
Government had insisted that it would only accept internment and instruct British forces 
to implement it if parades and marches were completely banned for at least six months. 
Equally ‘we have however made clear our view that the measures taken should not 
discriminate as between the different sections of the community’.45 He acknowledged 
that the decision carried dangers as well as advantages (for both Westminister and 
Stormont) and had implications and dangers for the Irish government, but, he argued. if 
Ireland had taken the decision to intern in the Republic, he could have used this as ‘an 
inducement to Faulkner to hold his hand’.46 This was an implicit reference to the British 
Government consideration that the security situation in Northern Ireland stemmed from 
the unsecure ‘border’ and consequently, IRA enclaves in the Republic.   
It seems that Ireland had indeed, several months earlier, considered a policy of 
internment in response to an ‘allegation’ of impending IRA violence. On 4 December 
1970, the Irish Government announced had that, according to reliable information 
obtained by An Garda Siochána, ‘secret armed conspiracy exists […] to kidnap one or 
more prominent persons’, including ‘plans to carry out armed bank robberies which the 
police believe may well involve murders or attempted murders’.47 In response the 
Government proclaimed the bringing into operation until further notice of Part II of the 
Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1940,48 which provides for preventive 
detention or ‘internment’.49 As a result, places of detention were to be prepared 
immediately. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe was to be informed that the 
                                                 
44
  Ibid., p. 2. 
45
  Ibid. 
46
  Ibid., p. 3. 
47
  DFA 2001/42/2. Statement from Government Information Bureau, 4 December 1970. See 
generally Dermot Keogh, Twentieth Century Ireland: Nation and State, New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, New York, p. 314. 
48
  Ibid. 
49
  Section 4, Part II of the Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1940, Act No 2 of 1940. 
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measures could involve derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights.50 
Article 15(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights authorises States to derogate 
from their obligations in the case of war or an emergency threatening the life of nation. 
The issue was to be kept ‘low key’, according to the memorandum of a meeting involving 
the Legal Adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs Mahon Hayes, Seán Morrissey 
and Taoiseach Jack Lynch. The letter to the Secretary-General would be signed by the 
Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe, Mary Tinney, who was to indicate 
orally to the Secretary-General that the letter was not a formal notice of derogation but 
that this would follow if derogation became necessary. 51 
The archives record the following: 
 
In reply to a general comment by the Taoiseach [Jack Lynch] wondering whether we are perhaps not over-
zealous in adhering to the letter of our international obligations, I [Mahon Hayes] said that, in the present 
case, our Department felt that it had to make known its view that it was doubtful whether a derogation from 
the Convention for the reasons indicated would stand up in the eyes of the international community. 
Furthermore, any intention to move away from our obligations under the Convention would inevitably have 
a reaction in the North and also in domestic political opinion. This was however, only one facet of the over-
all problem. The Government have also to take other considerations into account in the exercise of their 
right and duty to govern.52  
 
In this context, the State papers also indicate that at about the same time the Irish 
Government had also considered withdrawing from the European Convention on Human 
Rights altogether, something authorised by article 65.53 In a letter written in November 
1971, Mahon Hayes, who was Legal Adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs, noted 
he was ‘summoned home hurriedly’ in the second half of November 1970 to participate 
in discussions on a proposal that Ireland should denounce the European Convention on 
Human Rights.54 No document narrating these discussions could be found in the papers of 
the Taoiseach, Justice or Foreign Affairs departments. However, it seems probable that 
                                                 
50
  DFA 2001/42/2. Statement from Government Information Bureau, 4 December 1970. 
51
  DFA 2001/42/2. Secret Note from Hugh McCann, 7 December 1970. 
52
  Ibid. 
53
  There has been only one denunciation of the Convention, by Greece, in 1969. See: Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden v. Greece, (1970) 13 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 108, at p. 120. There have occasionally been suggestions of denunciation by States 
concerned about evolving interpretations of the Convention. The idea has been suggested that they 
could denounce the Convention and then accede to it again, but with a reservation aimed at 
neutralising the troublesome precedent. 
54
  DFA 2004/7/1936. Handwritten letter from Mahon Hayes to Declan Quigley, undated. 
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they were conducted deep in the background of the consideration of derogation. 
Ultimately, internment was never used in the Republic of Ireland; probably as the 
kidnapping operation did not materialise.55 Ironically, as observed by Mahon Hayes in his 
letter to Declan Quigley, rather than turn on the European Convention, through 
derogation or even denunciation, Ireland instead would soon invoke its provisions in the 
famous application filed against the United Kingdom. 
 
Public Initiatives to Prompt Government Action 
 
Among the State papers released by the Department of Foreign Affairs are letters 
documenting correspondence between Seán MacBride,56 who was then chair of the 
executive of Amnesty International, and Jack Lynch, commencing on the 9 August 1971. 
MacBride had written to inform Lynch of an option open to the Government, ‘in case this 
option had not already been drawn to your attention by your advisers’, whereby Ireland 
could refer to the European Commission of Human Rights ‘any alleged breach of the 
provisions of the Convention’ by another party to the Convention under article 24.57 
MacBride referred to the unlawful killing of [X] and ill-treatment of [Y]58 by British 
forces on 7 August 1971 as acts that were not subject to derogation.59 The contents of this 
letter were disclosed by MacBride on the RTE 1.30 pm news the same day,60 which Seán 
Ronan of the Department of Foreign Affairs described as putting the Taoiseach somewhat 
                                                 
55
  Dermot Keogh, Twentieth Century Ireland: Nation and State, New York St. Martin’s Press, 1995, 
p. 314. Keogh refers to an interview on 4 January 1971 with the Tanáiste (Deputy Prime Minister, 
Erskine Childers, who stated that 80% of the population would support the introduction of 
internment. 
56
  See: Catriona Lawlor, ed., Seán MacBride: That Day’s Struggle A Memoir 1904-1951, Dublin: 
Curragh Press, 2005 and Elisabeth Kane, An Irish Statesman and Revolutionary: The Nationalist 
and Internationalist Politics of Seán MacBride, London Tauris Academic Studies, 2006. 
57
  DT 2002/8/493. Letter from Seán MacBride to the Taoiseach Jack Lynch, 9 August 1971. 
58
  The names of the two individuals in question have been redacted pursuant to section 8(4) of the 
National Archives Act (1986). 
59
  DT 2002/8/493. Notice of derogation, required by article 15(3) of the Convention, was transmitted 
by the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe on 27 June 1957 and 
again on 25 September 1969. On 25 August 1971, further notice was given of the decision to 
introduce internment. It was described as within the strict exigencies of the situation, the legal 
conditions for measures taken pursuant to a derogation in the time of war or emergency 
threatening the life of the nation. 
60
  Compare: ‘MacBride’s call to Lynch: a case for the Human Rights Court’, Evening Press, 10 
August 1971. 
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‘out of court’.61 MacBride’s letter provoked a wave of correspondence from private 
citizens, non-governmental organisations and relatives of victims of ill-treatment to the 
Department of the Taoiseach calling for the government to bring proceedings before the 
European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg.62 
Among the initial correspondence, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association 
wrote: ‘….having been confronted with daily evidence of gross violations of human 
rights committed by the British Army in Belfast and in other parts of the North of Ireland, 
request your Government, as a matter of grave urgency, to institute proceedings on behalf 
of the victims concerned against the Government of the UK under the provisions of 
Article 24 of the European Convention of Human Rights’.63 Correspondence throughout 
the month of August included a telegramme received from Bernadette Devlin, MP for 
Mid-Ulster and a member of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, demanding 
the ‘immediate initiation of case against British Government at Strasbourg […] failing 
action by you we will contact the next closest Government posing as friendly’.64 A letter 
from Brian Brady of the Association of Legal Justice, co-signed by 22 persons and 
accompanied by numerous witness statements, ‘earnestly’ requested that the Taoiseach 
and the Government refer the matter ‘urgently’ under article 24 of the Convention.65 
Assisting the Department of the Taoiseach in delivering a response to MacBride, 
the Department of Foreign Affairs Legal Section drafted a memorandum analysing the 
jurisprudence of the European Commission of Human Rights.66 The main focus was the 
application of the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies, a requirement set out in 
article 26 of the Convention,67 with respect to inter-State complaints submitted pursuant 
                                                 
61
  DT 2002/8/493. Letter from Seán Ronan, Department of Foreign Affairs to Hugh O’Dowd, 
Department of the Taoiseach, 10 August 1971. This letter enclosed the legal opinion of the Legal 
Adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mahon Hayes, and a copy of the Convention and 
Protocol No. 1 thereto. 
62
  DT 2002/8/494. 
63
  DT 2002/8/493. Letter from the NICRA to the Taoiseach, 15 August 1971. 
64
  Ibid. Telegramme from Bernadette Devlin, 18 August 1971. 
65
  Ibid. Letter from 20 persons (Belfast) to the Taoiseach, 20 August 1971. 
66
  DT 2002/8/493. Letter from the DFA’s Legal Section to Assistant Secretary, Seán Ronan, 10 
August 1971. 
67
  Article 26 of the original text of the Convention states that ‘the Commission may only deal with 
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to article 24. The requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted as a condition for 
admissibility of an application is based upon the principle that a State must first be given 
the opportunity to resolve the problem before international litigation begins.68 The Legal 
Section acknowledged that although there had been ‘some doubt’ regarding its 
application in the past, the European Commission of Human Rights had ruled69 that 
article 26 applied to inter-state applications.70 This would require the dependents of the 
two victims whose names MacBride had proposed, [X] and [Y], to exhaust local 
remedies under United Kingdom law. Early acknowledgement was made to the 
‘weightiest factor’ being political considerations, which was not a matter for the Legal 
Section.71 
The final draft of the Taoiseach’s reply contended that the government was ‘of 
course, aware of the provisions of the Convention’, but said there were ‘some not 
inconsiderable legal difficulties arising from other provisions of the Convention, 
including Article 26’.72 Accordingly, coupled with the probability, even if successful, of 
lengthy proceedings, the Government ‘do not consider that it would be advisable, at least 
at the present, to pursue the course of action you have suggested’.73 In response, 
MacBride said the Taoiseach had not been ‘correctly advised’ regarding article 26, which 
only applied to individual petitions under article 25, invoking case law of the European 
Commission in support.74 But contrary to MacBride’s contention, these cases indeed 
required the exhaustion of local remedies as a precondition for admissibility of an inter-
State application to the European Commission. MacBride further argued that, while there 
might be a delay before the final judgment, he thought that the submission of a complaint 
against the United Kingdom, in relation to breaches of articles 2 (right to life) and 3 
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(prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment), would have 
‘immediate effect on the behaviour of its forces in the Six counties’, particularly given 
the likelihood of a fact-finding mission by a sub-Commission to compile evidence, which 
would in itself have an ‘important and immediate effect’.75 MacBride urged Lynch to 
take steps ‘in any event….as a matter of top priority’ to compile the evidence required to 
mount such proceedings in case a positive decision would be taken by the government in 
the near future.76 In a jibe at the government departments, he contended that the most 
difficult aspect of collecting such evidence would be establishing a team for the task, 
given the potential for ‘our rather inefficient and lethargic Departments’ not to do the task 
as completely as necessary.77 Lynch replied to the letter, reiterating the Government’s 
interpretation of the European Commission jurisprudence but adding that the whole 
question was ‘under the closest surveillance’.78 
The draft response to the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was slightly 
more positive.79 It reiterated the line adopted in the correspondence to Seán MacBride, 
but added that the Government had organised for the examination and assessment of the 
‘evidence available to them to date’, and that the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association might wish to forward evidence in its possession.80 Explaining the approach 
in the draft response for the Taoiseach’s office, Foreign Affairs acknowledged that this 
presented an ‘official indication’ of giving the question of submitting an application 
serious consideration but that the Minister for Foreign Affairs considered that ‘we should 
not back away from this question while at the same time not committing ourselves to 
proceed’.81 
While the Department of Foreign Affairs remained publicly both non-committal 
and non-dismissive on the question of mounting an inter-State case, the concept gradually 
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insinuated itself into discussions between Irish and British officials. The first meeting 
between the two governments was on 11 August 1971. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Patrick Hillery, met the British Home Secretary and Acting Prime Minister in Edward 
Heath’s absence, Reginald Maudling, in London. Hillery charged the British Government 
with adopting a strategy which could lead to civil war. He urged political initiatives 
resulting in minority participation in governing Northern Ireland, leading to eventual 
reunification, both of which required the end of internment as the necessary and urgent 
precursor. Maudling argued that Stormont was the ‘democratically elected’ assembly, 
that the internment strategy sought to remove the ‘gunmen’ and that progress on the 
political level could ensue after the violence had been contained.82 
The following day, 12 August 1971, Jack Lynch launched a lengthy public attack 
on the Stormont Government.83 He argued that the violent reaction to internment was not 
surprising and that the Irish Government supported the nationalist minority community in 
bringing the ‘misgovernment’ in Northern Ireland to an end. He called for recognition 
that the Stormont Government in Northern Ireland was directed at the suppression of the 
civil and human rights of the minority and it was clear that its Government’s main 
concern was to meet the demands of the most extreme members of its administration. He 
argued that the reform programme had been delayed and distorted and called for the 
replacement of the Stormont administration with a power-sharing administration, 
distributing power equally between nationalist and unionist constituencies.84 The 
Northern Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner was outraged. He described Lynch’s 
statement as ‘extraordinary’ in its general tone and language and considered it debatable 
whether it was compatible with ‘a decent relationship between neighbouring States’. He 
took the statement as evidence that constructive dialogue with the Irish Government was 
now impossible.85 
On 19 August, while Heath and Faulkner met in London, Lynch sent another 
telegramme to Heath, which he also made public. He argued that the events subsequent to 
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the introduction of internment demonstrated the failure of internment as a solution to the 
crisis, which now required political initiatives. He stated that if internment continued, he 
would support the policy of passive resistance adopted by the nationalist minority. In the 
alternative, he was open to a meeting of all interested parties aimed at designing the 
necessary political framework, ‘without prejudice to the aspiration of the great majority 
of the Irish people to the re-unification of Ireland’.86 
Heath sent a thundering reply, which he also published. He charged that Lynch’s 
telegramme was ‘unjustifiable in its contents, unacceptable in its attempt to interfere in 
the affairs of the United Kingdom and can in no way contribute to the solution of the 
problems of Northern Ireland’. He argued that equality and non-discrimination were the 
avowed policy of his Government and that the military operations were a defensive 
response to ‘armed terrorists many of whose activities originate in the Republic’.87 While 
he welcomed Lynch’s views given that he was the head of a friendly government, Lynch 
could not participate in meetings relative to the political development of the United 
Kingdom. Heath criticised Lynch’s decision to support the civil disobedience campaign 
as ‘calculated to do maximum damage to the co-operation between the communities in 
Northern Ireland’.88 
 
Dublin’s ‘Secret Report’ – the Investigation 
 
Meanwhile, the Irish Government had begun to take practical steps with the 
perspective of preparing an inter-State application against Britain at the European 
Commission of Human Rights. On 12 August, only a few days after internment was 
introduced, Seán Donlon, Ireland’s Consul General in Boston, received a phone call from 
Hugh McCann, who was Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs.89 McCann 
asked a series of pointed question clearly gauged to establish Donlon’s previous 
relationship with Northern Ireland. The responses established that he had neither family 
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nor friends in Northern Ireland nor could recall ever having visited, to which McCann 
replied; ‘you are just the man we want’.90 Donlon was instructed to return immediately to 
Dublin for an assignment expected to last no more than six to eight weeks. On arrival at 
Dublin Airport, he was met by a Department colleague who handed him the keys to a 
hired car. He was told that the Department of Foreign Affairs had received considerable 
information over the past two days on how internment had been introduced and wanted to 
establish a clear and more precise picture. Consequently, Donlon was to travel 
immediately to Belfast and begin what amounted to a clandestine investigation by an 
Irish diplomat on the territory of a foreign State. Donlon was given strict instructions by 
the Department of Foreign Affairs not to make any contact with subversive organisations 
on either the nationalist or loyalist side. Eventually, the British government became 
aware of Donlon’s movements and formally complained to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. The British noted that Donlon was not officially accredited and that as a result 
the British government could not guarantee his safety in Northern Ireland.91 
Donlon was instructed to begin by meeting Paddy Devlin, who was one of the 
Social Democratic Labour Party leaders in Belfast. Devlin had been one of the main 
sources of information for the Department of Foreign Affairs and would elaborate on 
narratives coming out of the detention centres. Devlin provided Donlon with an outline of 
the arrest operation and its aftermath and some of the detail on the narratives coming 
from detention centres.92 Devlin referred him to Brian Brady, at the time a teacher in St. 
Joseph’s College of Education. Immediately after the introduction of internment, Brady 
had began to accumulate what Donlon described as ‘half sheets of paper’ on internees.93 
These accounts had been collected from the relatives of detainees, after their visits to 
detention centres, and from those released within the first 48 hours of the 9 August arrest 
operation. Donlon later described Brady’s assistance as ‘extremely helpful’ for the 
Department’s investigation94 and he estimated that he was responsible for identifying 
‘about two-thirds of the material’ for the case before the European Commission.95 
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Furthermore, Brady had assisted greatly in obtaining ‘very urgent last minute jobs’ in the 
immediate advance of submitting the application.96 
Brady introduced Donlon to the Association for Legal Justice.97 It had established 
a clinic, operating virtually around the clock, to enable people to lodge complaints.98 The 
documented complaints were made available to Donlon only after it had been established 
exactly who he was working for. There was a moratorium for two or three days while 
certain people were consulted as to whether he should be given the material. At the time, 
Donlon suspected that the Association of Legal Justice leaned in the direction of the Irish 
Republican Army. In the context of his instructions, he recalled being ‘exceptionally 
careful’ in accessing the information he received from it.99 
Gradually, Donlon widened his network of sources. He was referred to Tom 
Conaty, of the Central Citizens Defence Committee, an amalgamation of street, parish 
and community defence groups established to defend against physical attacks on 
members of the community or destruction of property.100 As a co-ordination network of 
community groups, Donlon considered the Committee to be a ‘good route’ into 
establishing what was happening in various areas of Belfast. Donlon found it necessary to 
elicit the services of solicitors to assess the accuracy of the documents he had 
accumulated from Brady and others. Some of the accounts appeared ‘so outlandish that I 
was not inclined to accept it’, especially information on the men subjected to the ‘five 
techniques’. Donlon dealt principally with Christopher Napier, brother of the Alliance 
party leader Oliver Napier, and Pascal O’Hare. For material and expertise on the 
Northern Ireland legal system, he sought the advice of a young barrister, Charlie Hill.101 
Hill was later appointed legal adviser in the proceedings at Strasbourg. Donlon was also 
referred to physicians to whom internees had turned to on their release. By and large, he 
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had found the doctors to be ‘very helpful’. In essence, this network of local community 
leaders and professionals acted for him in his investigation as both the sources of the 
evidence and a means for assessing its credibility. As the evidence accumulated, he 
considered that it signalled the existence of numerous detention centres with selective 
interrogation techniques being applied, all of which appeared to be scientifically 
constructed.102 
After about two weeks, Donlon travelled to other places in Northern Ireland 
indicated by his Belfast sources, such as Tyrone, Fermanagh and finally Derry. In the 
majority of cases, he would first see the local Social Democratic Labour Party member, 
such as Austin Currie in Dungannon, Ivan Cooper in Strabane and John Hume in Derry. 
Subsequently, he would meet and interview people who had been arrested.103 Donlon had 
once been a clerical student in Maynooth, which was then the National Seminary for the 
entire island; including the parishes in Northern Ireland. Maynooth at that time was an 
‘enclosed semi-monastic situation’, which of course meant that members of a class of 105 
seminarians all knew each other well. Donlon had subsequently changed careers, joining 
Ireland’s diplomatic service, but some of his classmates were working as curates in 
parishes all over the island. During his 1971 mission, Donlon would introduce himself at 
the parochial house, where he might well know the curate personally. Otherwise, he 
would cite his time as a clerical student in Maynooth, in order to, in most cases, foster 
trust and network further.104 
Discussions with local priests were always covert. Many were anxious not to be 
seen to be involved in political activity. Nevertheless, this network assisted Donlon in 
establishing whom to contact. It was also as a source of information on the locality and 
the family connections and background of the detainees. Particularly outside Belfast and 
the main centres, this network was an indispensable asset in amassing information to 
supplement the witnesses’ narratives. Although he understood the expertise of local 
journalists, who possessed a wealth of valuable information on the locality, Donlon was 
unable to tap into this source of information for risk of exposing his identity and the 
reason for his presence in Northern Ireland. There was one exception. He approached the 
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legendary ‘Insight Team’ from the Sunday Times, investigative reporters who were 
travelling throughout Northern Ireland talking to political figures, community leaders, 
doctors, solicitors and other journalists. Of the unofficial contemporaneous inquiries, 
Donlon considered their investigative journalism to be the only competitor in terms of the 
depth of material collected. He would swap information with the Sunday Times reporters, 
although their mandate, to address the entire political crisis in Northern Ireland, was 
much broader than his own.105 
 
Advice on Strasbourg, and on Allowing ‘further little time’ 
 
In preparation for the 24 August Cabinet meeting, a relatively positive legal 
opinion on applying to the European Commission was drafted by the Legal Adviser to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Mahon Hayes, most probably in consultation with Declan 
Quigley of the Attorney General’s Office, and his legal assistant in the Department, 
Charles Lysaght.106 It was dominated by the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
Reference was made to the first Cyprus case, in the 1950s, in which the European 
Commission referred to the inapplicability of the rule in the case of an application 
regarding the compatibility of legislative or administrative practices with the rights under 
the Convention.107 However, it appears that a focus on the issue of ‘administrative 
practice’, which is required within the context of a ‘compatibility’ application, did not 
arise until a later stage in the legal analysis. The doctrine of an ‘administrative practice’ 
has two conditions; a repetition of acts and an official tolerance of this pattern or 
practice.108 Another relevant exception to the rule was the requirement that only effective 
remedies need be exhausted. This follows the general international legal rule regarding 
insufficient, inadequate or illusory remedies, but Hayes cautioned that it would be ‘fairly 
narrowly construed’.109 The other relevant exception was the existence of ‘special 
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circumstance’s preventing the exhaustion of effective remedies. It applies where remedies 
are not exhausted for fear of repercussions. 
Hayes said that an allegation of breaches of the Convention would be successful 
only if it related to article 3 of the Convention and was based on individuals who were 
internees, for whom convincing evidence of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
was available and for whom no domestic remedy exists, and who had availed themselves 
unsuccessfully of the review of detention by the Advisory Committee.110 His forecast 
proved to be clairvoyant. The central tenet of the August 1971 assessment, namely the 
success solely with respect to breaches of article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, prohibiting torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
mirrors the findings in the 1976 report of the European Commission of Human Rights 
and the 1978 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. But Hayes also said his 
views should not preclude submissions on other breaches of the Convention. Although 
such allegations were likely to be dismissed ‘probably at an early stage’, they would be of 
value in describing the general atmosphere of contempt for human rights, increasing the 
probability of success in the ‘main cases’ and putting pressure on the British ‘to live up to 
their responsibilities’.111 
The discussions on the question were already being fuelled by witness statements 
that Sean Donlon was sending back from Northern Ireland. Hugh McCann advised 
Hillery that the government decision on going to Strasbourg and its timing should be 
governed by the ‘probable’ consequence on British policy, given the requirement to 
persuade the British, rather than the Stormont parliament, on a course of action in the 
North. McCann contended that Heath was already questioning his recent policy 
decisions, an implicit reference to internment, as well as his ‘intemperate message’ to the 
Taoiseach. He considered that an agreement to establish an inquiry into allegations of 
brutality was evidence of Heath’s ‘second thoughts’. 112 McCann wrote: ‘I would favour 
affording some further little time to show evidence of a change of heart before taking any 
overt steps which would drive him [Heath] into obduracy – given his reputed 
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stubbornness’113. McCann stressed that this affording of ‘further little time’ did not 
preclude the collection of evidence, which he described as ‘desirable’, nor the attempts by 
victims to seek legal remedies available in local courts.114 
In the meantime, Irish officials were under growing pressure from representatives 
of civil society. In a private meeting on 23 August involving Mahon Hayes and other 
foreign ministry officials, the Chairman of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, 
Frank Gogarty, expressed frustration when the lawyers insisted upon the importance of 
the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule.115 Hayes explained that nothing would be 
gained if an application was dismissed on a matter of procedure. Gogarty responded: 
‘Action must be urgent; Britain must be brought to account; must prevent reoccurrence.’ 
He argued that if there is an injustice done, there is a moral obligation owed, which is 
above politics and it is the duty of a government to act. Sean Ronan, who was Assistant 
Secretary to the Department, countered: ‘[T]he government will have to have a 
reasonable chance of success.’116 On the same day, the Taoiseach met a delegation of 
Northern Ireland MP’s and Senators. When the issue of internment was discussed, 
Lynch’s response was to ask the delegation to assist in having evidence of brutality 
supplied to the government, where possible by way of affidavit.117 He also reminded 
them of the difficulties in bringing cases to the European Commission unless all local 
legal remedies were first exhausted.118 
When the Cabinet met on 24 August, it was agreed that the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs should make representations to British authorities for an immediate impartial 
inquiry into treatment of internees. However, the British authorities were also to be 
informed that failing the establishment of an independent inquiry, the government would 
feel obliged to consider bringing the matter of treatment of internees before the European 
Commission of Human Rights.119 The Irish ambassador to Britain, Donal O’Sullivan, was 
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despatched to make representations to the British authorities. He met with Sir Thomas 
Brimelow, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
on 25 August. He informed Brimelow that the Irish government wanted an independent 
inquiry whose composition should be non-British and whose terms of reference should be 
sufficiently wide to include not only the allegations of ‘brutality’ by the security forces 
but also the accusations of civilian killings by British forces.120 
The British were ‘taken aback’ when O’Sullivan stated that the Irish Government 
was considering whether to submit a case to the European Commission of Human Rights. 
Ambassador O’Sullivan stated that his government was under great pressure to do so. As 
he understood the law, derogations to articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention were 
not possible, even in the case of State emergencies. The British officials conveyed the 
‘strong hope’ that the Irish government would ‘wait on events’ before deciding to go to 
Strasbourg. O’Sullivan thought the British were ‘reasonably certain’ that the allegations 
were ‘grossly exaggerated’. In fact, the British were practically convinced that the Irish 
government was ‘backing a loser’ if it thought the charges of brutality were well-
founded. Ambassador O’Sullivan described the tone of the meeting as ‘completely 
friendly throughout’ and he had the impression that the Foreign Office wanted to be ‘as 
reasonable and conciliatory as possible’. He was told that Heath had ordered urgent 
action, and that General Tuzo, Head of the British forces in Northern Ireland, was 
anxious that an inquiry should proceed as urgently as possible. According to Ambassador 
O’Sullivan, the Irish government was ‘pushing an open door’.121 
On 31 August 1971, the British Home Secretary Reginald Maudling informed the 
House of Commons of the establishment of a Committee of Inquiry headed by Sir 
Edmond Compton, Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. It did not have an international 
chairman, and its sessions were held in camera to protect the personal safety of the 
security personnel. Its legitimacy was challenged by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association, and nearly all of the detainees decided against co-operation with it. When 
Heath and Lynch met at Chequers on 6 September, Lynch told the British Prime Minister 
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that the Compton Inquiry had been ‘badly received’.122 Clearly, there should have been 
an international Chairman and detainees should be legally represented. But Heath 
countered that he had been most careful in determining the composition of the 
commission of inquiry, and that Compton was ‘above reproach or suspicion’. Heath said 
that private hearings were necessary to avoid a ‘public jamboree’. 123 
Lynch dropped the threat of internationalising the allegations of ill-treatment. He 
stated that his government was under ‘strong pressure from the Opposition and minority 
representatives’ to initiate proceedings before the European Commission of Human 
Rights. He told Heath that a complaint could be made on a number of grounds, notably 
articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention. He doubted derogation from the European 
Convention of Human Rights could be justified, because the life of the nation could not 
be threatened by the situation in Northern Ireland, as a corner of the United Kingdom. It 
is intriguing that issues of international human rights law of some technical complexity 
were being debated by senior political figures. The stronger argument, for Lynch, was the 
prohibition of derogation set out in article 15(2) with respect to articles 2 and 3, even in 
the case of a‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. If Heath had been on 
his toes, he might have reminded Lynch that the Irish Government had itself successfully 
invoked derogation barely a decade earlier with respect to the situation in Northern 
Ireland in the first case to come before the European Court of Human Rights.124 
Three weeks later, Heath and Lynch held another meeting at Chequers. Lynch 
again attacked the interment policy, noting that the Compton Committee was 
unacceptable to the minority in Northern Ireland. He said he was ‘satisfied that there is a 
case for going to the Court of Human Rights under article 2 and 3 of the Human Rights 
Convention and he added that he is under very strong pressure to take action in this 
regard’. Heath responded that the Compton Committee was working ‘speedily and 
effectively’.125 He personally believed that ‘much of the talk about ill-treatment was no 
more than understandable propaganda by the internees. 126 
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Turning to the Lawyers 
 
Sean Donlon returned to Dublin in mid-September 1971 with ‘literally sack loads 
of material’ which he delivered to Declan Quigley in the Office of the Attorney 
General.127 While Quigley was analysing the material, Attorney General Colm Condon 
sent junior barrister Aidan Browne to assist Donlon in assessing whether there was a 
‘sustainable case’. He was to gauge if the witnesses could stand up to what, in all 
probability, might be strenuous cross examination in Strasbourg. Browne travelled with 
Donlon to Belfast to interview proposed witnesses.128 In order to gain entry to Crumlin 
Road Jail and conduct the interviews, Donlon accompanied solicitor Pascal O’Hare, 
claiming to be his apprentice, while Browne went in with solicitor Charlie Hill, claiming 
he was a student at the Northern Ireland bar.129 
These prison visits were subsequent exposed in the Irish media. Under the 
headline ‘Dublin gets secret report on torture’, the Irish Press explained that the 
allegations against the British Army were being examined by the Irish government 
through the offices of Aidan Browne. The article recounted that a ‘comprehensive 
dossier’ of individual cases alleging ‘brutality, torture and brain-washing’ of people 
detained in the North by British troops and members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
was being compiled by the Irish government following ‘a secret week-long visit to the 
North by Mr. Aidan Browne’. It referred to Browne’s visit to Crumlin Road Jail to 
interview internees and emphasised the fact that the investigations were being conducted 
‘without any consultation with the Stormont authorities and […] without their 
knowledge’.130    
Browne reported his general findings to the Attorney General who, in turn, as far 
as Eamonn Gallagher was aware, advised the Taoiseach that the investigations 
demonstrated a ‘sustainable case’.131 There is no record in the State Archives of a 
memorandum to Jack Lynch from the Attorney General; it must be among the Attorney 
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General’s Office papers, which have yet to be released. However, a minute from Charles 
Lysaght, Assistant Legal Adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs, refers to the 
Attorney General’s advice to the Taoiseach, adding that it was given ‘without any 
consultation with our Legal Section’.132 As a response, the government decided that there 
was enough evidence to justify constituting a legal team.133 In addition to Declan Quigley 
of the Attorney General’s Office, and Mahon Hayes and Charles Lysaght of the Section 
in Foreign Affairs, Attorney General Colm Condon retained a number of barristers 
including Anthony Hederman, who was later a Justice of the Supreme Court, and John L. 
Murray, the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
The Department of Foreign Affairs also drew upon the expertise of Professor 
Robert Daly, who had recently returned from the United States to take up appointment as 
Professor of Psychiatry at University College Cork. Daly accompanied Donlon to 
Northern Ireland to meet some of the released internees but also fellow professionals.134 
An English psychiatrist, who was an expert on interrogation techniques, was also 
consulted.135 Donlon recalls that this combined expertise led the government’s 
investigation to establish, ‘probably’ by October, that the interrogations were not a 
question of physical assaults on internees but the exercise of ‘very highly organised, well-
tested techniques, which had probably been used elsewhere in the world in places like 
Oman probably going back to WWII but considerably more advanced since then’.136 
On 17 October 1971, the Sunday Times Insight team published its in-depth report 
on allegations of ill-treatment. The report probably prompted the Taoiseach to instruct the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, the following day, to draft a letter for the British 
Ambassador informing him of the Taoiseach’s intention to announce in the Dáil the 
following week the government’s decision to submit a complaint to Strasbourg.137 But 
Lynch was counselled not to use the threat of proceedings before the European 
Commission. In advice to the Taoiseach on the initial draft from the Department of 
                                                 
132
  DFA 2004/7/1936. Minute from Charles Lysaght to Secretary of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Hugh McCann, 16 November 1971. 
133
  Ibid. 
134
  Interview of Seán Donlon by Aisling O’Sullivan, 8 February 2007. 
135
  Probably Dr. John Wing or Professor Sheppard of Maudsley Hospital, Denmark Hill, London. See 
DFA 2002/19/427. Letter from Peader de Paor (Patrick Power) to Mr. Small, 7 January 1972. 
136
  Interview of Seán Donlon by Aisling O’Sullivan, 8 February 2007. 
137
  DFA 2003/17/304. Note on procedure, 18 October 1971. 
Schabas and O’Sullivan  Page 26 
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary to the Department of the Taoiseach said reference to the 
warnings to Heath about proceedings at Strasbourg as not having their ‘desired effect’ 
was essentially recording a ‘lack of success’. Second, it could imply that the institution of 
the Strasbourg proceedings was ‘a bargaining counter’. According to the Department, 
‘the institution of proceedings had to be preceded by careful consideration and 
investigation and by the exhausting of domestic remedies by the aggrieved’.138 In the 
final draft, the British Ambassador, Sir John Peckm was informed that after ‘careful 
examinations’ and material at his disposal from ‘reliable sources’, the Taoiseach was 
satisfied that breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights ‘appear to have 
taken place in a substantial number of cases’. Hence, the Irish government were ‘now’ 
seriously considering taking the decision to institute proceedings.139 
The British Ambassador replied the following day, outlining his government’s 
position.140 He charged that allegations of brutality were ‘part of the stock-in-trade of the 
IRA’ and that his Government had publicly stated such allegations were being 
investigated by the Compton Committee.141 He emphasised that complaints before the 
European Commission must be examined with supporting evidence whereas previous 
petitions brought by individuals from the Northern Ireland were in the form of general 
allegations, without supporting evidence.142 
 
In these circumstances, my Government hope that the Irish Government would prefer to wait and study 
very carefully the findings of the Compton Committee in each case before they take up a position which 
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could bring them into open dispute with the British Government, particularly if it was on the basis of 
allegations which might later prove to be unfounded.143  
 
The same day, Lynch delivered a lengthy speech in the Dáil in which he said Britain 
should be held accountable for its international obligations, including those under the 
European Convention on Human Rights.144 
At the end of October, Eamonn Gallagher, Seán Donlon, Mary Tinney, Charles 
Lysaght and Declan Quigley met to review their responsibilities in preparing the 
application.145 Donlon was to continue to amass statements and supplementary material 
from solicitors, doctors and community leaders. This would be assessed by Declan 
Quigley.146  The Attorney General’s Office had assumed primary responsibility for the 
case at an early stage. This, as Charles Lysaght explained, was because the Taoiseach had 
handed over ‘some papers in connection with the case when it was first mooted’, and also 
because of understaffing in the Legal Section in the Department of Foreign Affairs.147 
However, Lysaght explained that it was the view of the Legal Adviser, Mahon Hayes, 
that the Legal Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs ‘is the body primarily 
responsible for proceedings under the European Convention and nothing should be done 
which implies acceptance of any other view’ and consequently ‘we should insist that the 
evidence be submitted to us before a final decision is made to proceed’.148 He said ‘we 
should be more expert in weighing the weight of evidence before the European 
Commission’.149 
Donlon returned to Belfast on 11 November where he spent a week gathering 
more information.150 At the same time, Eamonn Gallagher travelled to Dungannon, Derry 
and Strabane, collecting statements and other information as evidence before joining 
Donlon in Belfast on the evening of 15 November.151 Later in the month, Donlon told 
Gallagher that ‘Kevin Street’, meaning the wing of Sinn Féin that was associated with the 
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Provisional Irish Republic Army, had instructed its followers not to co-operate with the 
Irish Government’s investigations. Hence, some of the promised material from the 11 
November expedition would not be handed over as evidence for the Government’s 
application.152 
Donlon was not overly troubled, as he had also established a ‘working 
arrangement for swapping information with Amnesty International’, and the final 
investigation should cover ‘something like 75 cases’.153 In the end, some 228 cases of 
alleged ill-treatment were referred to in Ireland’s application to the Commission.154 The 
development of this working relationship with Amnesty International is described in a 
minute of the Department of the Taoiseach, drafted following a visit to the Department by 
Seán MacBride. Amnesty International was preparing to conduct an investigation. The 
Amnesty inquiry would be conducted by Dr. Hermann van Guns, a Dutch medical doctor 
who worked for the World Health Organisation, and Thomas Hammerberg, a Swedish 
journalist and chairman of the Swedish section of Amnesty International, currently the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe. Torkel Opsahl of the Law 
Faculty of the University of Oslo was yet to be confirmed. Opsahl had been elected a 
member of the European Commission on Human Rights in 1970, and he sat on the sub-
Commission that heard witnesses in the Ireland v. United Kingdom case in 1975. 
MacBride suggested that Amnesty International’s investigator and the Department of the 
Taoiseach co-operate confidentially in exchanging statements concerning torture and 
brutality. This was agreed to, and Seán Donlon was instructed to liaise with the Amnesty 
International investigator, who would also be operating in Belfast.155 
 
‘Further little time’ Runs Out…. 
 
The Compton Report was published by the British Government on 16 November. 
Mahon Hayes, the Legal Adviser to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, believed that 
it ‘clearly established an administrative practice of ill-treatment, which the [European] 
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Commission would very likely hold amounted to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’.156 Indeed, in its admissibility decision of 1 October 1972 in the 
inter-State case, the European Commission of Human Rights distinguished the use of the 
‘five techniques’ from other allegations of ill-treatment and concluded that the Compton 
Report, as well as the subsequent Parker Report, which acknowledged official sanction 
for the use of the techniques, provided the substantial evidence required to establish an 
administrative practice.157 So the Compton Report was rightly believed to provide the 
means to overcome the difficult issue of the exhaustion of domestic remedies. In effect, 
the British Government had snookered itself. Its own inquiry handed the Irish legal team 
success at the admissibility stage. 
Lynch concluded that the Compton Report coupled with the Irish government’s 
investigation demonstrated ‘very substantial evidence of a very grave state of affairs in 
the administration of justice in the North’. The government would examine both carefully 
to decide whether to refer the allegations to the European Commission of Human Rights, 
he said.158 This reference to ‘careful’ examination obviously sought to bide more time for 
the government’s investigation. Donlon was due to travel north again on 22 November to 
obtain more statements and supplementary evidence. However, given the interest of 
deputies in recent Dáil debates, it is unsurprising that the publication and dissection of the 
Compton Report intensified parliamentary and media focus on whether the government 
would decide to initiate proceedings before the European Commission of Human Rights. 
Lynch’s attempts to bide time on the question of submitting an application were 
becoming more difficult to sustain. 
At the 23 November sitting of the Dáil, the leader of the Opposition, Liam 
Cosgrave, asked whether the Taoiseach was now in position to state whether a definite 
decision on submitting an application to Strasbourg had been taken.159 Tánaiste (Deputy 
Prime Minister) Erskine Childers reiterated the common line on collecting and evaluating 
evidence but added to a likely government decision within days. On being pressed 
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regarding formal protests against the methods of interrogation,160 Childers said such 
proceedings would be lengthy – he thought they might take one to two years - and that 
they would be unlikely to have any immediate practical effects on the interrogation 
policies of British forces.161 
The Financial Times suspected that Irish Government wanted to await the view of 
British MP’s in their Northern Ireland debate. It interpreted the mood in Ireland: 
 
The Government here is now under strong pressure both from its own back benches and from the 
Opposition to press a case against Britain through the European Commission and this pressure has 
increased since the public condemnation by Cardinal Conway and five Roman Catholic bishops in the 
North of the interrogation methods used on detainees.162 
 
With parliamentary and media anticipation of an imminent government decision, the 
Cabinet prepared to debate the question of submitting an application to the European 
Commission at its meeting scheduled for 30 November 1971.163 Prior to the meeting, 
Hugh McCann prepared a memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was 
reportedly now more favourable to the whole idea. McCann assessed the probable effects 
on political relationships if the Irish Government were to initiate proceedings. He 
anticipated sympathy from some European States, who are ‘very sensitive on this issue of 
torture of prisoners’, specifically The Netherlands and Italy. But he cautioned that it is 
likely that future partners in the European Economic Community would not be 
‘enthusiastic about two new members entering into this kind of conflict in public on the 
eve of their membership’. Nevertheless, a European forum for such a dispute would be 
preferable to the United Nations, where the Soviet Union and other socialist States might 
‘seek to exploit the situation’. On Anglo-Irish relations, McCann stated the obvious. The 
move would be ‘strongly resented by the British Government and lead to a considerable 
deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations’. McCann concluded: ‘If Mr. Heath's previous 
outbursts are any guide he would probably be furious at least in the short run. One might 
expect that Britain would get "really dirty" in handling our affairs.’ He also calculated 
that an application to the Commission would compel the British to be ‘more careful’ in 
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dealing with detainees. This would slow down their gathering of intelligence information, 
making a military solution more difficult, and that would force the British to deal with the 
crisis at the political level. McCann noted the personal view of the Irish Ambassador to 
Britain, who was opposed to going to Strasbourg. According to McCann, while purely 
from the international relations standpoint it would not be wise to proceed, views of the 
minority in Northern Ireland as well as public opinion in the Republic had to be 
considered. ‘[T]he pressures appear to be greater’ and it would probably be difficult for 
the government not to prioritise those pressures.164 
On 29 November, Lynch received a message from Edward Heath attempting to 
dissuade Lynch and the Cabinet from taking a positive decision on submission. After 
outlining the steps taken by the British Government in response to the allegations, he 
stated: 
 
My reason for hoping that these problems will not be brought before the European Commission relates 
rather to the danger that my Government and yours would there by ranged on opposite sides in a public 
forum on issues which, starting from particular allegations and explanations would be liable to broaden out 
into charges and counter-charges concerning the operations of the IRA, the role they have in Northern 
Ireland and the support they receive in the Republic. Such a position could hardly fall to result in 
acrimonious exchanges between our two Governments. This would to my mind be unfortunate given the 
complexity of the Northern Ireland problem and the need for our two Governments to remain in the closest 
and friendliest touch about it. This will be particularly necessary if the security situation in the North 
develops sufficiently favourably for an early impetus to be given to political moves.  
 
As you know, our aim is still to discuss the way forward with representatives of all the communities. We 
are committed to finding a way to give the minority there an active, permanent and guaranteed role in the 
life and public affairs of Northern Ireland. As we are making clear in the debate in the House of Commons, 
the best method and timing for doing this is very much in the forefront of our minds. It is because of these 
considerations that I hope that you will not feel constrained to give way to pressures to take a public stance 
against us at Strasbourg. If you do, it will no doubt rejoice the hearts of many people in the Republic and 
some of those among the minority in the North. It will however, also please those Protestant extremists who 
are always most opposed to the maintenance of a reasoned dialogue both public and private between our 
two Governments.165 
 
But Heath’s letter did not deter the Cabinet, which decided that the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Irish Government, should refer to the European 
Commission of Human Rights recent breaches ‘in the six counties’ of the European 
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Convention on Human Rights by the British government.166 The minutes show that the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hillery, was absent when the decision was taken.167 The 
announcement of the government decision168 led to debate in the Dáil. It focussed mainly 
on the formal diplomatic protests. Here, Lynch described the history of the diplomatic 
efforts of the Irish Government and framed this history in the context of finding redress 
through ‘private diplomacy’, which was considered the best approach between 
‘neighbouring Governments’.169 However, the Government failed to ‘persuade’ the 
British Government to fairly and adequately respond. Later in the debate, on being 
incessantly quizzed on whether formal protests were made at the highest level, Lynch 
declared in reference to the application to the European Commission of Human Rights, in 
apparent exasperation, ‘we have taken the extreme step now. Are the deputies not 
satisfied with what we have done?’170 The British Government expressed regret that the 
Irish government had ‘chosen to make a governmental dispute of this issue’. It claimed 
the allegations could have ‘usefully’ been put at the disposal of British authorities for 
investigation.171 
 
Filing the Application: Fog in Paris 
 
With the government’s announcement came the impetus on the legal team to 
conclude preparations for the submission as early as possible. It was hoped to file the 
application at ‘a very early date’, preferably by 10 December. A political decision would 
still be required concerning allegations of breaches of article 2 of the Convention by 
British armed forces. The Legal Adviser, Mahon Hayes, was requested to submit his 
views on the nature of the case to the Attorney General’s Office. Further information was 
received from Ireland’s Permanent Mission to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. 
Ireland was urged to prepare fifty copies of its application, which could then be 
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considered on a preliminary basis as early as mid-December. Then, the British 
government would be formally notified and requested to make observations.172 
On 6 December 1971, the Taoiseach, accompanied by the Irish Ambassador, 
Donal O’Sullivan, met with Heath in his office in the House of Commons for a 
discussion about the security and political situation in Northern Ireland. The encounter 
proceeded along predictable lines. On security, Lynch referred to border incidents, such 
as incursions into the Republic by British forces and the cratering of roads along the 
border, and the thorny question of extradition, which, he argued, was a matter for the 
Courts. Heath referred to the need to maintain effective security along the border and to 
resolve the question of the South as a safe haven, possibly through extradition.173 Lynch 
mentioned the immense pressure he had been subjected to, in the wake of the Compton 
findings, to submit an application to the European Commission of Human Rights. 
Heath’s only response was to tell Lynch ‘you resisted as long as you could’.174 
 On 7 December, the Irish Cabinet informally agreed on the nature of the 
application. It would refer to breaches of article 1 (general duty to secure), article 2 (right 
to life), article 3 (prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 
article 14 (prohibiting discrimination on specified grounds). The Attorney-General’s 
memorandum to Cabinet explained that by invoking article 1, the entire scope of the 
Special Powers Act and its Regulations could be considered by the European 
Commission of Human Rights. The disadvantage was that this argument was too 
‘legalistic’. Furthermore, it was uncertain, given the lack of precedent of the substance of 
article 1.175 Complaints based on article 2 were ‘very much sought by the Northern 
Nationalists, would appeal to the public and, even if doomed to failure, would have the 
advantage of highlighting the general atmosphere’. The disadvantage, said the Attorney-
General, was its ‘doom’ to failure for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The strongest 
claim relied upon article 3, with the Compton Report providing ‘great assistance’ in 
demonstrating an administrative practice. Moreover, this accusation had the most 
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‘popular appeal’. The only disadvantage was possible difficulty for some of the cases of 
ill-treatment regarding the domestic remedies rule, but it was felt this could be overcome. 
Finally, on article 14, the application sought to refer to the British Army searching of 
homes and the ‘general behaviour’ of the security forces, as forms of discrimination on 
the basis of political opinion and association with a national minority. The disadvantage 
was that while evidence was ‘no doubt in existence’, it had not been assessed.176 
With the submission imminent, the question of appointing an agent arose. In the 
Lawless v. Ireland case, this task was fulfilled by Ireland’s Permanent Representative to 
the Council of Europe.177 But the Anglo-Irish section cited the British practice of 
appointing the legal adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.178 Ultimately, 
Mahon Hayes, Legal Adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs, was appointed. 
There were many meeting over the course of a few days in mid-December as the 
government struggled to finalise its application.179 The team agreed to plead the case on 
the following grounds. First, certain killings in Northern Ireland constituted breaches of 
article 2. Second, the treatment of internees under interrogation and otherwise constituted 
torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment within the terms of article 3. 
Thirdly, the scope of internment was ‘wider than necessary’ having regard to the strict 
exigencies of the situation and hence, was beyond the permissible right of derogation 
under article 15. Finally, internment and the search of houses had been conducted in a 
discriminatory manner, breaching article 14 of the Convention.180 
 Fittingly, Seán Donlon, who had surreptitiously collected most of the proof upon 
which the application was based, was given the task of travelling with the ‘three or four 
sacks’ of evidence and the formal application to Paris and from there by train to 
Strasbourg to lodge the application. Hillery had promised the Dáil that this would be 
done by 16 December, and Donlon was under strict instructions to respect this 
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commitment. But his early-afternoon flight to Paris was diverted to Brussels due to fog. 
Donlon took a taxi to Paris, where he was greeted by Kestor Heaslip, First Secretary at 
the Paris Embasy. Donlon and Heaslip met the Secretary-General of the Council of 
Europe for the purposes of filing the application at his Paris hotel at 1.00 am on the 
morning of 17 December 1971. But the Secretary-General had agreed to stop the clock. 
For official purposes, it was recorded that the application was submitted at 11.45 pm in 
the evening on 16 December. Donlon has described the ‘ceremony’ as ‘informal and 
brief’. The Secretary General had pulled trousers over his pyjamas and accepted the 
application through the ‘dimly lit doorway’ of his hotel bedroom.181 
 
Conclusion 
 
The application went on to make legal history. Ireland was successful before both 
the European Commission on Human Rights and, subsequently, the European Court of 
Human Rights. To this day, the case stands as an exceedingly rare example of inter-State 
litigation concerning human rights violations. It is particularly unusual given that it 
concerns two modern democracies with extremely close commercial and political links. 
Since Ireland v. United Kingdom there have been only a few more inter-state 
applications, in any forum.182 The inter-State application mechanisms of the United 
Nations human rights treaties183 have never been invoked. For example, the United States 
has accepted the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee to consider inter-State 
communications based on alleged violations of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, but no State party to the Covenant appears to have contemplated filing a 
complaint based upon the contemporary equivalent of British detention facilities in 
Northern Ireland, namely the prison camps in Iraq, Afghanistan and Cuba, and the secret 
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jails in Poland and Romania.184 Nor has the inter-state complaint procedure of the 
International Criminal Court been used to initiate proceedings, with the exception of 
three so-called ‘self-referrals’.185 Indeed, when the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court was being adopted, it was frequently argued that State party referral 
could not be an effective mechanism to launch prosecutions precisely because of the 
sterility of inter-state complaint mechanisms within the human rights sphere.186 It is also 
possible for one State to sue another before the International Court of Justice for breach 
of a human rights obligation, but there is only one example of such a phenomenon.187 
Seán MacBride launched the process in response to internment. His personal role 
is intriguing, given that he had himself been foreign minister of Ireland when the 
European Convention on Human Rights was being drafted and adopted. MacBride’s 
public call for an application to Strasbourg gained unrelenting momentum as the months 
wore on. Allegations of ill-treatment that were published in both British and Irish 
newspapers kept the idea of an inter-State application alive among a watchful media, an 
active civil society and a tense parliament. The tragic increase in violence in the post-
internment autumn of 1971 intensified calls for the Irish government to respond 
adequately. In this respect, the publication of the Compton Report, which had been 
commissioned by the British Government to investigate reports of abuse, was the point of 
no return. Subsequent parliamentary debates in Dáil Éireann signalled the deputies’ 
expectation of a quick and decisive response by the Irish Government. In such an 
environment, Jack Lynch’s Cabinet would have had immense difficulty convincing the 
parliamentary Opposition, the expectant media and the vocal public that any other course 
would be appropriate under the circumstances. 
While these external factors were key, there were naturally very important parallel 
internal factors. As Seán Ronan’s position at the 2 August 1971 meeting between 
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Department of Foreign Affairs officials and Frank Gogarty of the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association indicates, the Irish Government required a high probability of success 
for a positive decision to be forthcoming. Hence, Attorney General Colm Condon’s 
positive determination, that on the weight of the evidence a sustainable case could be 
made, was crucial. Without this determination, a positive decision to submit the 
application might well have been outweighed by foreign relations considerations, 
particularly relations with Britain and Ireland’s prospective partners in the European 
Economic Community. Instead, it resulted in a seminal ruling of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Arguably, the pressure that the application brought on the British had 
beneficial effects in terms of reducing the mistreatment and abuse of prisoners. 
 
 
